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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study projects the economic impact of the design, construction, and operation of a tran-
sitway running along a roughly 9 mile segment, the so-called corridor, from downtown Hartford to
the Griffin Center in Bloomfield. Two transportation modes are compared--a light rail transitway
(LRT) and a busway.
This study was commissioned by the Greater Hartford Transit District (GHTD) with support
from:
• the Capitol Region Council of Governments (CRCOG),
• the Connecticut Department of Economic Development (DED),
• the U.S. Department of Transportation, and
• the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CTDOT),
• as well as other public and private funding sources,
to assess the economic costs and benefits of a transitway investment in the Griffin Line Corridor.
The study relies on data provided by the above organizations as well as the Rideshare Company
(the regional rideshare brokerage and major employer Transportation Management Organization
[TMO]) and the corridor municipalities. Data and technical support were also provided by Bechtel
Corporation, a project engineering and engineering management consultant to GHTD.
This study was funded to provide the Economic Impact Study necessary as part of an ongoing
Major Investment Study of the Griffin Corridor under preparation by GHTD. In conjunction with a
number of other reports and analyses, these results will be submitted to the Connecticut Department
of Transportation and the Federal Transit Administration in 1995.
The LRT project involves a total capital expenditure of $215 million while the busway alterna-
tive involves a total capital expenditure of $127.2 million. The LRT capital expenditures are distrib-
uted as follows and the approximate years of expenditure: $174.3 million (1993-2000), $8.6 million
(2011 and 2023), and $23.5 million (2018). The busway alternative involves Capital expenditures of
$94 million (1993-2000), $14.5 million in (2011 and 2023), and $4.2 million (2018).
The study assumes that twenty percent of the capital expenditure is funded by the state with
the remainder funded by federal sources; net operating expenses for the Griffin Line are assumed to
be funded fully from state sources.
The results of the two alternatives are summarized in Table A. The impact is most pronounced
in Hartford County. Therefore, the reporting effort focuses on the impact there.CCEA ii  GRIFFIN LINE
Table A. Economic Impact Summary, 1995-2030.
Hartford County.
Connecticut in italics.
Case 1, with the Light Rail Line implemented, is clearly the most desirable on an employment
basis. Of the 2,246 private-sector (nonfarm) net job-years created, 2,115 are in Hartford County
and 131 are in the rest of Connecticut. More public sector jobs accrue to Hartford than elsewhere in
the state; that Hartford is the site of the development as well as the state capitol makes this unsur-
prising. Moreover, in a state the size of Connecticut, Hartford jobs are state jobs; people commute
to jobs in Hartford from every corner of the state.
The present value of the change in real disposable income reflects the change in household
wealth and real buying power. Hartford County households increase the present value of their fu-
ture buying power by about $71.0 million, whereas households in the rest of Connecticut gain $1.8
million in the present value of their buying power. This distribution of benefits is characteristic of
such localized public investments. Although State funding is reduced elsewhere in the State, the re-
mainder of the State (outside of Hartford) still enjoys a positive economic impact.
One way to evaluate the projected return is through the benefit/cost ratio. The benefit/cost ra-
tio is State personal (pre-tax) income divided by the cost of the project to the State. It suggests how
much pre-tax income the average taxpayer receives for every dollar of his or her taxes that is di-
verted to finance the project. Comparing total State expenditures to the change in the present value
of real income suggests a benefit/cost ratio of 2.12 for the project under the assumptions of Case 1.
This amounts to the average taxpayer receiving $2.12 in income for every dollar the taxpayer gives
up in taxes to sponsor the project. Essentially, the benefit/cost ratio must exceed 1.0 to imply a
positive return. Due to the federal subsidy in particular, the ratio for the Griffin Rail Line is u n-
commonly high. More common favorable ratios typical to public works projects funded across the
U.S. are on the order of 1.4-1.8. This implies that, aside from the fact that the benefit is greater to
Hartford than elsewhere in the state, this project has considerable state-wide social benefit, and a
more productive use of the funds involved is not likely to be found.
Case 2 implements a busway to service the Griffin Corridor. There is a slightly larger increase
in both net total and private sector employment in the rest of Connecticut (158 versus 131), while in
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In Case 2, total economic activity in Hartford County increases by $24.8 million ($1995) and
decreases by $7.7 million elsewhere in the state. Over the 35-year period, real disposable income
increases in Hartford by $43.3 million, and increases elsewhere in the state by $1.6 million. Com-
paring total State expenditures to the change in the present value of real income suggests a bene-
fit/cost ratio of 2.21 for the project under the assumptions of Case 2. This amounts to the average
taxpayer receiving $2.21 in pre-tax income for every dollar the taxpayer gives up in taxes to sponsor
the project. This is a productive use of funds that generates measurable social benefits.
On a benefit/cost basis, Case 2 is the slightly more advantageous case. The benefit/cost ratio,
however should not be the sole measure by which the project is evaluated. In Hartford County,
Case 1 produces two-thirds more new net job-years, twice the increase in Disposable Income and
nearly two-thirds more gain in Gross State Product. By these critical measures Case 1 has the
greatest positive economic benefit on the State.
In summary, either alternative produces highly desirable economic stimulus for the state as a
whole. Each case examined the capital expenditures result in a reduction in disposable income for
Connecticut residents outside Hartford County. The positive impact is largely localized in Hartford
County, and in some cases comes at some cost to the rest of the state. Yet, on average, every tax-
payer dollar spent brings $2.12-$2.21 to the taxpayer. These benefits are realized while fulfilling the
goal of providing commuters a realistic means to get to jobs in and out of Hartford while reducing
traffic congestion and vehicle pollutant emissions.
The light rail system may appear less desirable by some measures than the busway as a result
of higher, up-front fixed costs combined with the study selection of a 9 mile corridor from Hartford
to Griffin Center. Extending the line to Bradley Airport more completely leverages the investment.
As shown in the March 1994 study, Griffin Line Corridor Study: Economic Impact Analysis, ex-
tending the light rail line to the airport increases the cost/benefit ratio to 5.24, and increases private-
sector net job-years to 6,581 statewide, with 5,418 of them in Hartford. Gross State Product soars
as well.
The study forecasts that the demand stimulus provided by the Griffin Line is not fully cap-
tured, representing a lost opportunity for the state. The growth in consumer demand resulting from
the project is satisfied primarily through the “import” of goods and services from producers outside
the state. Connecticut business expansion never catches up. This is probably because long-run busi-
ness costs remain lower outside the state, so that it is cheaper to produce elsewhere and then ship to
Connecticut. This results in a net “import” of goods into the state.
The problem here is not the Griffin Line Alternatives. If Connecticut business costs are higher
than elsewhere in the country, it is a problem that exists prior to the Griffin Line. This project nei-
ther creates the problem nor appreciably exacerbates it. The Griffin Line modestly decreases busi-
ness costs. This analysis simply highlights the obstacle that this cost competitiveness represents for
any demand stimulus. The Griffin Line investment could be combined with other state programs to
improve the state’s competitiveness, resulting in substantially more positive impact than the pro-
grams could generate separately. A greater portion of the increased demand could be satisfied
through local production and employment, providing a smoother, more sustainable growth path.
For example, the impact of the Griffin Line could be enhanced by the implementation of a
parking policy in downtown Hartford. As reported in the prior study, Griffin Line Rail Corridor
Pilot Study: Phase 2A, Technical Memorandum 2.2: Parking Policy Scenarios (January 1993), an
optimal parking policy includes the adoption of market pricing for parking in the Hartford CBD and
Asylum Hill areas in combination with a transit subsidy of $60 per month per employee. The pro-CCEA iv  GRIFFIN LINE
posed parking policy would create cost savings for Hartford CBD/Asylum Hill area businesses as
employer parking subsidies would be replaced by lower cost transit subsidies. An earlier report
Griffin Line Corridor Study: Economic Impact Analysis (March 1994) studied the effect of i m-
plementing this “optimal” parking policy in conjunction with the construction of a light rail line to
serve the entire Griffin Corridor (to Bradley International Airport). The benefits of coupling the
construction and parking policy is two-fold: businesses save and there is substantial additional
stimulus to the State and local economies. The net combined effect of the extended LRT and the
parking policy is to create seven and a half times as much private employment as the shorter LRT
without the parking policy, and over three and a half times as much total employment. At the same
time, real GRP expands by more than six times as much, and and the after tax purchasing power of
the populace is more than tripled.
Thus, it is possible to capture some of the lost opportunity by supplementing the project with
other policies or projects. Broad-ranging reforms of business taxes, or alternatively, localized tax
relief in the form of enterprise zones or targeted industry clusters could do much to foster long-term
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INTRODUCTION
This study was commissioned by the Greater Hartford Transit District (GHTD) with support
from the Capitol Region Council of Governments (CRCOG), and with grant support from the Con-
necticut Department of Economic Development (CTDED), the U.S. Department of Transportation,
and the Connecticut Department of Transportation (CTDOT), as well as other public and private
funding sources, to assess the economic costs and benefits of transitway investment in the Griffin
Line Corridor. The data underlying this study were developed over the past five years by these
groups in cooperation with the corridor municipalities.
 The Griffin Line Transit Project involves a 9 mile segment from downtown Hartford to the
Griffin Center in Bloomfield, terminating at Griffin Center Office Park. The study supports an ex-
tensive Major Investment Study of the Griffin Line Corridor under preparation by GHTD for the
Connecticut Department of Transportation and the Federal Transit Administration. This economic
impact study considers the implications of alternative forms of public transit, a light rail line versus a
busway, to service this study corridor.
The GHTD is performing a Major Investment Study (MIS) for the abandoned railroad right-
of-way north of Hartford known as the “Griffin Line”. As part of the MIS, GHTD is studying vari-
ous engineering, community operational, ridership and financial aspects of the project on a feasibil-
ity/conceptual level. The most capital intensive alternatives are the busway and the Light Rail alter-
natives. The major objectives of the Griffin Line project are:
• To improve mobility and access in the Griffin Line Corridor,
• To provide a focal point and catalyst for economic and community development,
• To support the long term attainment and maintenance of the regional air quality standards 
and energy conservation.
The present study substantively provides the economic impact data required under the second
item. Specifically, in this study we project the retention and expansion of economic activity, jobs,
tax base, and economic welfare in the form of total and per capita real disposable income. Further-
more, we examine changes in employment by sector, changes in spending patterns by final demand,
as well as demographic shifts.
Various associated programs and development projects, dependent upon the Griffin LRT and
Busway are also evaluated:
• LRT and busway implications, and other development considerations required under the
Clean Air Act and
• Increased number of jobs accessible to zero car households.
Along the way, ridership, traffic, and travel time savings are considered, as well as Phase 2A
Capital and Operating Cost Estimates and Ridership Projections. For more on these topics see the
Greater Hartford Transit District, Griffin Line Rail Corridor Pilot Study: Phase 2A, Technical
Memorandum, Sections 1, 2.1-2.4, 3.1-3.2, 4 and 5, 1992 and Griffin Line Corridor Study: Eco-
nomic Impact Analysis, 1994 and the Technical Memoranda developed to support the current MIS.CCEA 2 GRIFFIN LINE
This study is limited to the initial “leg” of the Griffin line ending at Griffin Center, and does
not directly consider the following related proposed programs and development projects:
• Extension of the transit line to Bradley International Airport,
• Amphitheater and related development projects,
• Projections of additional development attracted to the Corridor,
• Enterprise Zone,
• CBD Loop, and
• Downtown Station.
These projects, although synergistic to the Griffin Line, were not included herein to provide a
focus on Griffin Line impacts.CCEA 3 GRIFFIN LINE
CCEA CONNECTICUT ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In 1992, with funding from the Connecticut Department of Economic Development (DED),
the Department of Economics at the University of Connecticut acquired a microcomputer-based
econometric model of the Connecticut economy from Regional Economic Models, Inc. (REMI). A
Massachusetts-based firm with historical ties to the University of Massachusetts, REMI has devel-
oped an expertise in regional econometric modeling, and is a leading supplier and developer of such
models. Following the acquisition of the model, the Department of Economics at the University be-
gan the formal process to create the Connecticut Center for Economic Analysis (CCEA).
In 1993, the CCEA, with funding again from DED and private sources, acquired another eco-
nomic model from REMI that breaks out Hartford and Fairfield Counties, allowing each county to
be studied in isolation or combined with the rest of the state.
The REMI models include all of the major inter-industry linkages among 466 private in-
dustries, aggregated into some 49 major industrial sectors. With the addition of farming and three
public sectors (state & local government, civilian federal government, and military), there is a total
of 53 sectors represented in the models.
At the root of the models are the results of extensive modeling efforts at the U.S. Department
of Commerce (DoC). The DoC has developed, and continues to develop, an input-output model
(or I/O model) for the United States. Modern input-output models, largely the result of the path-
breaking research by Nobel laureate Wassily Leontief, focus on the inter-relationships between i n-
dustries, and provide micro-level detail regarding factor markets (including the labor market),  inter-
mediate goods production, as well as final goods production and consumption. Conceptually, the
model is constructed in the form of a table, a kind of cross-reference, in which each cell summa-
rizes the sales-purchase relation between industries or sectors.
An example may help to make clear the value of this structure. Suppose that one cell  changes;
wages for labor rise in one specific sector. The labor cell in that sector would change. Then the
change would flow through the table, affecting inputs and outputs in other industries along the chain
of production. At the same time, businesses might substitute capital machinery (automation) or
other inputs that appear more cost effective as a result of the change, offsetting to some extent the
rising cost of labor. Workers may attempt to shift their employment to the sector with the higher
wages. That is, all of the elements of the model, just like the economy it represents, are related to
all other elements of the model.
The REMI Connecticut model takes the U. S. I/O “table” results and scales them according to
traditional regional relationships and current conditions, allowing the relationships to adapt at rea-
sonable rates to changing conditions. Additionally:
• Consumption is determined on an industry-by-industry basis, from real disposable income in
Keynesian fashion.
• Wage income is related to sector employment factored by regional differences.
• Property income depends only on population and its distribution, adjusted for traditional re-
gional differences, not on market conditions or building rates relative to business activity.CCEA 4 GRIFFIN LINE
• Estimates of transfer payments depend upon unemployment details of the previous period.
Moreover, government expenditures are proportional to the size of the population.
• Federal military and civilian employment is exogenous and maintained at a fixed share of the
corresponding total U. S. values, unless specifically altered in the analysis.
• Migration into and out of the state is estimated based upon relative wages and the “ameni-
ties” of  life in Connecticut versus other states.
• “Imports” and “exports” from other states are related to relative pricing and production costs
in Connecticut versus elsewhere.
Depending on the analysis being performed, the nature of the chain of events cascading
through the model (economy) can be as informative for the policymaker as the final aggregate re-
sults. Because the model generates such extensive sectoral detail, it is possible for experienced
economists in this field to discern the dominant causal linkages involved in the result.
In the sections that follow, the final aggregate results are discussed and important causal link-
ages highlighted. The model output summary tables for the cases examined are included as an ap-
pendix.CCEA 5 GRIFFIN LINE
METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS
The transit alternatives are evaluated in comparison to each other. Our analysis provides de-
tailed forecasts for Hartford County, the rest of Connecticut, and the State as a whole.
Because the economic impact is largely limited to Hartford County, we focus our analysis on
changes in economic activity in the County. Because the investment is made by the State, and resi-
dents statewide will pay the State’s share of the expenses in terms of higher taxes or reductions in
other state services, the cost/benefit analysis is made for the State as a whole.
We outline the analysis and policy variables involved:
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES.  Capital expenditures for the Light Rail Line alternative total $215
(in 1994 dollars), over the period 1995-2030. By the year 2000, 81% of the total expenditures are
made with the remainder of the capital expenditures made in 2011, 2018, and 2023 ($8.6 million,
$23.5 million, and $8.6 million, respectively). Total capital expenditures for the Busway are $127.2
million with nearly three-quarters of the total capital expenditure made by 1999. The rest of these
expenditures: $14.5 million, $4.2 million, and $14.5 million are made in the years 2011, 2018, and
2023, respectively.
The State of Connecticut is expected to subsidize the continuing operations of either system.
Riders will pay a fare that covers only a portion of the total cost of the ride. Given the State’s bal-
anced budget requirement, the cost of the subsidy was entered as a corresponding reduction in other
state expenditures. Since the reduction was entered in percentage terms, each region of the state had
its share of state spending reduced by the same proportion. (State and Local spending; variable
1314)
The total operating cost of each of these lines was entered as the output of that line. This vari-
able is an “output translator”; the increase in output was entered in constant dollar terms, and it is
distributed across the output sectors of the economy according to historical norms. (Variable 217)
OTHER COSTS. Over 1,700 cars daily are diverted from driving in or out of Hartford because
their drivers will opt to ride on the Griffin Line Light Rail, while the implementation of the Griffin
Busway will divert nearly 2,000 drivers. In each case, one half of the operating cost or just over 37
cents per mile for cars in Connecticut was allocated to depreciation and maintenance service. Multi-
plying this figure by the average daily trip distance for the work-trip cars and the non-work-trip cars
and the average number of such riders, we obtained an estimated daily cost saving to the drivers of
these diverted cars. The annual total of these savings from each alternative was entered into the
model. (Variable 161)
The other half of the saving on auto costs discussed above was assumed to be spent on fuel.
(Variable 166)
Approximately one-half of all the riders that will take the Griffin Line previously used other
forms of public transit. The fare and state subsidy for these riders will be lost to the other forms of
public transit and were therefore subtracted from that system as revenues. That is, the demand for
“traditional” public transit was reduced by the total of the fares of the “transplanted” riders. (Vari-
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Each car diverted (because their passengers opt to take the Griffin Line) is no longer renting a
parking space in Hartford. Assuming the supply of parking space is perfectly inelastic and assuming
demand has declined, we calculated a new rental rate for parking space. The change in rate times
the traditional number of space rented in Hartford represents a loss to parking lot owners.  The
value of output in this industry was reduced by this figure. (Variable 184)
BENEFITS. The Griffin Line will reduce the travel time of the people who previously drove
cars into and out of Hartford. With fewer vehicles on the roads, the remaining drivers will be able to
make their trips into and out of Hartford in less time. Also, fewer vehicles on the road means better
air quality due to fewer vehicle emissions. The value of these time savings were evaluated using
USDOT benchmarks. These time savings improve the quality of life in the Hartford area, so they
were considered in the model input as an amenity term. Amenity is measured according to value of
these time savings as a percent of labor income. (Population variable 11)
Moreover, people will only ride the Line if the dollar cost of the ride is less than the dollar cost
of their best alternative source of transportation. Above car savings for work riders and nonwork
riders were mentioned.  To these car savings, we added the savings on parking fees.  At present the
major employers are charging their employees only a fraction, on average, of their actual parking
costs. Once we subtract the fare that these riders have to pay from their car and parking savings,
we have a measure on new spendable income for workers and nonworkers alike. These net savings
were entered as new disposable income for Hartford area residents. (Variable 1311)
The Griffin Line provides an additional mode of transportation for transit dependent house-
holds and therefore, has the potential to increase job accessibility/opportunities to zero car house-
holds. (Variable 999)
While the employee saves on parking fees, so also does the employer.  At present, the major
downtown employers are leasing nearly 7,000 parking spaces at $115 per month on average.  Each
employee car diverted represents a saving to the employer of this parking lease fee less what they
collected from the employee for the space.  These savings to the employers were entered as a re-
duction in labor costs. (Variable 1314)
The study considers two transitway alternatives — a Light Rail and a Busway.
Case 1: Light Rail Line Alternative Is Implemented.
Case 2: Busway Alternative Is Implemented.
In each case, we examine the changes in important economic variables from the alternative
forecasts, and compute a benefit/cost ratio based upon the present value of state expenditures and
changes in real disposable income. It should be noted that the prior study for the entire corridor,
Griffin Line Corridor Study: Economic Impact Analysis (March 1994) entails similar assumptions,
however, they are slightly different in some cases. Detailed comparisons of the results should be
done carefully.CCEA 7 GRIFFIN LINE
IMPACT ANALYSIS — CASE 1: GRIFFIN LIGHT RAIL LINE ALTERNATIVE
In this case a light rail line is implemented running between Hartford and Griffin Center. The
State of Connecticut pays 20% of the capital costs, and 80% derives from federal sources. The
State pays all of the net operating costs.
As shown in Figure 1, peak increases in total employment in Hartford, including the govern-
ment and farming sectors, occur in 1999 with the addition of 829 total jobs. Of these, 616 jobs are
in the private nonfarm sectors, and 213 are in the government sector. The majority of the annual,
new job creation in the private, nonfarm sectors occurs during the construction and design period
and the other periods of capital expenditure
Most of the early job creation is driven by the design and construction activity. Once normal
operations commence and the direct construction jobs are lost, net job creation remains positive,
and increases year by year. Once the construction activity is complete, the net increase in Hartford
jobs in this period is lowest in 2002 with an increase in employment of 121 jobs, and rises to 425
jobs gained by 2018 due to additional capital expenditures. The net increase of 121 jobs in 2001 is
attributable to a loss of 65 private, nonfarm jobs and an increase of 186 government sector jobs.
The growth in government sector employment reflects Griffin Rail Line employment and the expan-
sion of government services to support the population growth stimulated by the additional economic
activity.
Figure 1. Total Employment in Hartford County Resulting from the 


























Prior to 2001, the design, planning, and construction, financed in large part by external funds,
provide stimulus to the private sector. Once, the construction phase is complete, continuing opera-
tions are heavily subsidized by public funds; under the state’s balanced budget constraint, this i m-
plies an increased reallocation of public resources. At a glance, Figure 3 reveals negative values of
private nonfarm investment (external funding) from 2001-2008. However, these negative values are
misleading. The construction phase stimulus results in firms re-scheduling some expansions. Capital
projects that might have occurred in the years 2001-2008 based upon typical depreciation rates and
earlier lower expectations of consumer demand, are moved up into the 1996-2000 period. SomeCCEA 8 GRIFFIN LINE
degree of post-contruction investment slowing is therefore to be expected. The resulting business
investment is better demonstrated by the net present value of investment, which is $14.43 million
(1995 dollars).
We can confirm that the early job creation in Hartford results from the design and construction
effort by examining the breakdown of job creation in the peak year 1999. As shown in Figure 2,
463 of the jobs created in 1999 are in the construction industries; 80 of the jobs are in the service
industries, reflecting, among other things, engineering and consulting services associated with the
project. The wholesale and retail trade industries add 63 jobs.
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Approximately 55% of the employment change is in the construction sector, as compared with 10%
in the service sector. As shown in Figure 3, the final demand stimulus comes primarily from con-
sumer spending — about $20.98 million in real terms (1995 dollars) in 1999. In the same year,
fixed investment rises by $8.75 million in real terms, driven mainly by a $4.56 million increase in
residential investment and $3.32 million increase in business equipment.



















As consumer spending is stimulated by the initial construction boom and subsequent capital
expenditures, government spending decreases. The decline in the expansion of government spendingCCEA 9 GRIFFIN LINE
becomes negative as the benefits of the light rail outweigh the expense. Consumer demand declines
from 2000-2003 (See Figure 3), then begins to rise as the benefits of increased employment and
cost reductions are realized. Reduced demand in the automobile and the automobile service indus-
tries erode the demand for private investment. Growth in production in Hartford County is insuffi-
cient to meet demand causing “imports” from the rest of the state and elsewhere to exceed “ex-
ports” after 2000. Slower growth in private investment coupled with negative net exports make for
a lost opportunity to expand the capital base enough to fully capture the economic benefit of the
Griffin Line investment. This dominates the aggregate economy of Hartford County, after the year
2000 (See Figure 4). Hartford’s Real Gross Regional Product (GRP), a measure of the total eco-
nomic activity in the region, is negative after 2000, as consumer demand is met by purchases from
outside the region. The productive capacity for consumer goods in Hartford County does not grow
sufficiently to absorb the increased consumer demand, forcing residents to “import” consumer
goods. The excess of demand over productive capacity does not leave as much capacity for goods
produced for “export,” reducing the potential for sales outside the region. Any ancillary policies en-
acted that reduce net imports would, then, also positively impact GRP and employment.




























On the other hand, the real disposable income remains positive and has been boosted through-
out the post-construction period by subsequent capital expenditures throughout the analysis period
(See Figure 5). Unfortunately, this does not translate so clearly into a GRP increase because this
positive change in buying power relative to net business investment results in the negative change in
net exports. Population changes can influence the average disposable income. Therefore, in FigureCCEA 10 GRIFFIN LINE
6, we review the measure on a per capita basis as a proxy measure for the economic well-being of
Hartford County residents.
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The negative changes in per capita real disposable income from 2001 on can be attributed to
immigration into Hartford County.  Population levels increase by 480 and 469 in 2000 and 2001,
respectively. Figure 6 shows that at the peak of Hartford’s per capita real disposable income each
person in Hartford County would receive an additional $9.50 in after-tax income to spend in 1999.
At first glance, the negative changes in per capita real disposable income from 2001 on
would seem to offset the earlier increases in the measure, but on a present value basis the earlier
improvements dominate. It is the nature of present value computations that events further from the
present are weighted less than events in neighboring years. Thus, the decreases in the measure are
discounted more than the increases because they occur later.
Benefit/Cost Ratio. Because the entire state bears the cost of the proposed transitway, we
compare statewide benefits, in terms of the change in real personal income, to the total expenditure
financed by the state. Real personal income is the total  inflation-adjusted income stream to resi-
dents. Increases in this measure represent improvements in real buying power, and therefore an
improved (economic) standard of living. Thus it reflects the net economic welfare of the total
populace. To compute the Benefit/Cost Ratio, we compare the real present values of the increase in
real personal incomes to the real present value of the state expenditures by residents (the cost). That
is, we form the ratio of the change in income (the change in disposable income plus cost) and the
cost. This is accomplished in Table 1.
The computed Benefit/Cost Ratio of 2.12 compares favorably with other projects of this type.
In fact, ratios of 1.4 to 1.8 would be more common for favorable results for similar public works
projects. Principal reasons for this outcome are the injection of funds from outside the state. These
results could be further improved by an increase in investment, improving productive capacity and
therefore the ability to respond locally to the increase in consumption demand.
On a statewide basis, net private sector job-years created (2,246), net total job years created
(5,588), the present value of the change in real gross state product ($34.3 million), and the present
value of the change in real disposable income ($72.8 million) represent the more significant impact
of the two cases studied. The positive economic impact of the Griffin Light Rail is uncommonly
favorable. Coordinated with other public policy to improve the state’s ability to competitively pro-
duce needed goods and services could increase the impact further.CCEA 11 GRIFFIN LINE
Table 1
Case 1: Griffin Rail Line Alternative
Changes in Connecticut
Private Gross
Nonfarm Total Personal Disposable Regional
Year Employment Employment Population Income Income Product
1995 3 3 19 0.4 0.1 0.2
1996 98 76 34 4.0 1.7 5.2
1997 132 133 72 7.3 2.8 7.5
1998 536 736 272 41.6 16.1 27.4
1999 761 955 561 61.7 21.6 40.4
2000 292 436 685 40.1 11.8 14.2
2001 -118 -22 612 13.0 2.5 -8.8
2002 -117 -24 512 9.4 2.2 -8.8
2003 -104 -13 438 7.7 2.1 -8.4
2004 -86 4 376 7.3 2.2 -7.7
2005 -65 24 327 8.0 2.4 -6.8
2006 -44 44 291 9.6 2.7 -6.0
2007 -27 61 266 11.7 3.1 -5.2
2008 -12 76 250 14.3 3.4 -4.6
2009 0 90 240 17.3 3.7 -4.1
2010 10 101 235 20.6 3.9 -3.6
2011 107 198 253 37.9 6.3 1.8
2012 17 109 253 27.6 4.2 -3.4
2013 19 112 238 29.5 4.3 -3.2
2014 21 113 226 31.6 4.3 -3.1
2015 24 117 216 34.4 4.4 -3.0
2016 28 122 208 38.2 4.6 -2.8
2017 31 127 205 42.7 4.7 -2.6
2018 286 384 270 117.9 11.3 12.1
2019 29 141 293 63.1 5.4 -2.4
2020 30 148 281 67.6 5.6 -2.1
2021 29 148 282 71.5 5.7 -2.1
2022 29 148 285 76.9 5.8 -2.1
2023 124 244 312 120.6 8.4 3.4
2024 26 147 321 92.9 6.0 -2.2
2025 27 148 318 98.9 6.2 -2.1
2026 28 149 319 106.9 6.3 -2.0
2027 31 151 323 116.1 6.5 -1.9
2028 32 152 327 126.3 6.7 -1.8
2029 33 154 334 137.8 6.9 -1.7
2030 35 156 340 150.8 7.1 -1.6
Notes: Disposable Income, Personal Income, and Gross State Product are in millions of 1995
dollars. The net present value of the Disposable Income series is $72.8 ($1995). The Benefit/Cost
Ratio is 2.12.CCEA 12 GRIFFIN LINE
IMPACT ANALYSIS — CASE 2: GRIFFIN BUSWAY ALTERNATIVE
This case study implements the Griffin Busway Alternative to service a route from Downtown
Hartford to Griffin Center in Bloomfield Center. As in Case 1, the State of Connecticut pays 20%
of the capital costs, and 80% derives from federal sources. The State pays all of the net operating
costs.
Hartford County peak increases in total employment, including the government and farming
sectors, occur in 1999 with the addition of 284 total jobs. Of these, 282 jobs are in the private non-
farm sectors, and 2 are in the government sector. Most of these jobs are driven by the design and
construction activity. Once normal operations commence, the net job increase is only positive be-
cause of growth in the government sector; private sector job losses peak in 2002 and 2003 with a
loss of 15 jobs each year. We estimate that 9 of the jobs lost will be manufacturing jobs, while 6 are
nonmanufacturing. While the creation of 134 and 133 government sector jobs in each of those same
years reflects Griffin Busway employment however, most of the jobs are related to the expansion
of government services to support the increased population. From 2008 on, job creation is positive
in both the private and public sectors. The spike in private, nonfarm employment in 2011 corre-
sponds to a projected capital expenditure of $8.6 million.
Figure 7. Total Employment in Hartford County Resulting from the 























Prior to 2001, the design, planning, and construction, financed in part by external funds,
provide stimulus to the private sector. In the years 2002-2010, the construction phase is complete,
and the continuing operations proceed. These continuing operations are heavily subsidized by public
funds; under the balanced state budget constraint, this implies that a portion state spending each
year will be diverted from other uses to support the Griffin Line. The expanding productive capacity
of the region is unable to keep pace with the new growth in demand, leading to increased “imports”
into the region. Figure 9 shows only small positive values of private nonfarm investment (external
funding) beginning in 2001. The construction phase stimulus results in firms re-scheduling some
expansions. Capital projects that might have occurred in the years 2002-2010 based upon typical
depreciation rates and earlier lower expectations of consumer demand, are moved up into the 1996-
2001 period. The resulting business investment is better demonstrated by the net present value of
investment, which is $8.66 million (1995 dollars).CCEA 13 GRIFFIN LINE
We can confirm that the early job creation results from the design and construction effort by
examining the breakdown of job creation in the peak year 1999. As shown in Figure 8, 228 of the
jobs created in 1999 are in the construction industries; 22 of the jobs are in the wholesale and retail
trade industries, 28 of the jobs are in the service industries, reflecting, among other things, engi-
neering and consulting services associated with the project.
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Approximately 80% of the employment change is in the construction sector, as compared with 1%
in the government sector. As shown in Figure 9, the final demand stimulus comes primarily from
net exports — about $32.28 million in real terms (1995 dollars) in exports and $16.96 million in
imports in the peak year 1999. In the same year, consumer spending rises by $6.98 million in real
terms (1995 dollars), driven mainly by the $1.20 million increase in services, other than health
services and $1.07 million increase in food and beverages.


















Year by year, the stimulus to consumer spending of the construction boom and increase in
government spending decreases. Reduced demand for automobiles, automobile service, gas, oil,
parts, etc., all reduce the demand for private business investment. The growth of production in
Hartford County is insufficient to meet demand, causing “imports” from the rest of the State and
elsewhere to exceed “exports” after 2000, a missed opportunity to expand the capital base enoughCCEA 14 GRIFFIN LINE
to fully capture the economic benefit of the Griffin Busway investment. This ultimately dominates
the aggregate economy of Hartford County from 2001-2010 and 2012 forward (See Figure 10.).
Real Gross Regional Product (GRP), a measure of the total economy activity in the region, declines
during these years because consumer demand is being satisfied by purchases of goods produced
outside the region. The productive capacity for consumer goods in Hartford County does not grow
sufficiently to absorb the increased consumer demand, forcing residents to “import” consumer
goods. The excess of demand over productive capacity does not leave as much capacity for goods
produced for “export,” reducing the potential for sales outside the region.













Real disposable income, on the other hand, remains positive throughout. Real disposable income is,
loosely speaking, a measure of the after-tax buying power of the populace. Reflecting the increased
government spending and consumer activity, this measure increases broadly in the early years, but
appears to level-off in the later years (See Figure 11.). As mentioned before, this positive change in
buying power relative to insufficient net business investment results in the negative change in net
exports, although this could possibly be mitigated by aggressive state policies.












Population changes can erode influence the average disposable income. Therefore, in Figure
12 we review the measure on a per capita basis as a proxy measure for the economic well-being of
Hartford County residents.CCEA 15 GRIFFIN LINE
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At first glance, the negative changes in per capita real disposable income from 2001 on
would seem to offset the earlier increases in the measure, but on a present value basis the earlier
improvements dominate. It is the nature of present value computations that events further from the
present are weighted less than events in neighboring years. Thus, the decreases in the measure are
discounted more than the increases because they occur later.
Benefit/Cost Ratio. Because the entire state bears the cost of the proposed transitway, we
compare statewide benefits, in terms of the change in real personal income, to the total expenditure
financed by the State. Real personal income is the total  inflation-adjusted income stream to resi-
dents. Increases in this measure represent improvements in real buying power, and therefore an
improved (economic) standard of living. Thus it reflects the net economic welfare of the total
populace. To compute the Benefit/Cost Ratio, we compare the real present values of the increase in
real personal incomes to the real present value of the state expenditures by residents (the cost). That
is, we form the ratio of the change in income (the change in disposable income plus cost) and the
cost. This is accomplished in Table 2.
The computed Benefit/Cost Ratio of 2.21 compares favorably with other projects of this type.
In fact, ratios of 1.4 to 1.8 would be more common for favorable results for similar public work
projects. One of the principal reasons for this outcome are the injection of funds from outside the
state. The results could be further improved by an increase in investment, improving productive
capacity and therefore the ability to respond locally to the increase in consumption demand.
 On a statewide basis, net private sector job-years created (1,498), net total job years created
(4,281), the present value of the change in real gross state product ($17.1 million), and the present
value of the change in real disposable income ($44.9 million) all represent desirable outcomes. The
positive economic impact of the Griffin Busway is uncommonly favorable. Coordinated with other
public policy to improve the state’s ability to competitively produce needed goods and services
could increase the impact further.CCEA 16 GRIFFIN LINE
Table 2
Case 2: Griffin Busway Alternative
Changes in Connecticut
Gross
Private Total Personal Disposable Regional
Year Employment Employment Population Income Income Product
1995 2 2 18 0.4 0.1 0.2
1996 -3 -15 11 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3
1997 92 92 31 4.7 1.9 5.2
1998 224 222 94 12.5 4.7 12.5
1999 335 327 183 20.8 7.2 18.9
2000 157 262 269 21.4 6.7 6.8
2001 -30 49 277 10.1 2.5 -3.8
2002 -33 47 258 9.4 2.5 -3.8
2003 -30 51 247 9.4 2.5 -3.7
2004 -26 55 236 9.7 2.6 -3.5
2005 -18 65 229 10.7 2.7 -3.2
2006 -11 74 224 12.1 2.9 -2.8
2007 -5 79 221 13.5 3.0 -2.5
2008 2 88 221 15.4 3.2 -2.3
2009 7 93 221 17.2 3.4 -2.1
2010 12 100 223 19.7 3.5 -1.8
2011 167 252 261 45.6 7.2 6.9
2012 9 96 269 25.6 3.7 -2.0
2013 9 95 252 25.9 3.6 -2.0
2014 13 100 242 27.7 3.7 -1.8
2015 15 102 232 29.5 3.7 -1.7
2016 20 107 224 32.5 3.9 -1.5
2017 22 109 218 35.4 3.9 -1.4
2018 71 161 226 52.1 5.2 1.4
2019 30 127 231 47.5 4.5 -0.8
2020 32 130 230 52.1 4.6 -0.6
2021 34 134 232 57.3 4.7 -0.5
2022 34 135 235 62.4 4.8 -0.5
2023 188 286 278 127.7 8.9 8.4
2024 23 121 287 74.1 4.7 -1.1
2025 21 119 273 75.4 4.7 -1.2
2026 22 119 265 79.2 4.8 -1.2
2027 25 123 262 86.1 5.0 -0.9
2028 27 125 259 93.0 5.1 -0.8
2029 29 126 258 101.0 5.2 -0.8
2030 31 128 259 110.2 5.4 -0.7
Notes: Disposable Income, Personal Income and Gross State Product are in millions of 1995
dollars. The net present value of the Disposable Income series is $44.87 ($1995). The Benefit/Cost
Ratio is 2.21.CCEA 17 GRIFFIN LINE
CONCLUSIONS
In Case 1 it is clear that, (1) assuming federal funding of 80% and state funding of 20% of the
capital cost of building the Griffin Light Rail, (2) state funding of all of the net operating costs, and
(3) capital expenditures totaling $215 million, the construction and operation of the line would be a
net benefit to the residents of Connecticut (Table 5.). Net, almost 5,600 job years, averaging 160
jobs per year, would be created between 1995 and 2030. In real, present value terms, total eco-
nomic activity in the State would increase by $34.3 million and total consumer buying power would
increase by $72.8 million over the years 1995-2030. For every tax dollar spent by the state, the in-
come of the populace increases by $2.12.
In Case 2, the same capital cost scheme as in Case 1 and a total capital expenditure of $127.2
million, there is a net gain of 1,498 private-sector job-years and 4,281 total job-years. Total eco-
nomic activity in the state (real GRP) increases by $17.1 million and total consumer buying power
increases by $44.9 million on a present value basis. Every tax dollar required is repaid with 2.21.
Table 5. Economic Impact, State of Connecticut 1995-2030 — Summary.
As suggested earlier, one sector of economic activity that consistently showed room for i m-
provement was net exports. As consumer demand grows in the model, the Connecticut economy
produces too little business investment to allow business expansion to keep up. This is not rectified
in the face of rapidly increasing consumer demand, and is likely the result of higher costs of doing
business in Connecticut than elsewhere. Thus, increasingly, consumers and retailers are forced to
turn to suppliers and producers outside the state. Coupling the Griffin Line development with pro-
grams designed to stimulate business investment and expansion could result in dramatically better
results than those reported here.
The economic impact of the Griffin Light Rail could be enhanced by the extension of the line
to cover the 14 mile stretch from downtown Hartford to Bradley International Airport with the im-
plementation of a parking policy. Table 6 shows a cost/benefit ratio of 5.24, nearly two and a half
times the cost/benefit ratio of the shorter project. If the Griffin Light Rail were extended, for the
cost of approximately doubling the construction costs, the State would nearly triple its gains in pri-































2,246 5,588 $34.3 million $72.8 million $215 million 2.12
2. Busway
Alternative 1,498 4,281 $17.1 million $44.9 million $127.2 million 2.21CCEA 18 GRIFFIN LINE
more, economic activity (real GRP) is quadrupled and after-tax purchasing power is nearly tripled.
Clearly, there is an economy of scale that substantially favors the larger transitway investment.
As earlier mentioned, the implementation of a parking policy in downtown Hartford along with
the Griffin Light Rail would make the plan even more desirable. The benefits of  the construction
and parking policy is two-fold: businesses save through a reduction in labor costs and consumers
accrue additional spendable income which stimulates the State and local economies. The net com-
bined effect of the extended line and the parking policy is to create seven and a half times as much
private employment as the shorter LRT without the parking policy, and over three and a half times
as much total employment. At the same time, real GRP expands by more than six times as much,
and and the after tax purchasing power of the populace is more than tripled.
Clearly, the extension of the Griffin Line in conjunction with a parking policy would be not
only socially beneficial but considerably more beneficial then Case 1 as considered in this study. For
more details on the effects of the extension of the line to cover the 14 mile stretch from downtown
Hartford to Bradley International Airport with the implementation of a parking policy see Griffin
Line Corridor Study: Economic Impact Analysis, 1994.
Table 6. Economic Impact, State of Connecticut 1995-2030 — Transitway Construction.
With the increase in productive capacity, regional demand could be satisfied within the region.
This turns negatives in net exports into positives in regional consumption. Moreover, the buying



















































16,820 20,011 $211.9 million $377.1 million $335.3 million
($1995)
3.93CCEA 19 GRIFFIN LINE
In summary, then, the Griffin Line (as analyzed) is a good investment for the State of Con-
necticut. The federal contribution, leverages the state’s resources to result in a benefit/cost ratio for
the state that is atypically high for a public works project. More important, the jobs gains and eco-
nomic growth exhibited are impressive.
The results of this analysis and the earlier study of a transitway to Bradley International Air-
port demonstrate the importance of the project implementation plan. An effective project imple-
mentation plan, coordinated statewide, can further maximize the substantial benefits demonstrated
herein for the corridor, the region, and the state.CCEA 20 GRIFFIN LINE
APPENDIX: MODEL DETAIL
Model detail, Cases 1 & 2, are provided in a separate appendix.